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Institutions and Electricity Systems Transition towards Decarbonisation 
The hidden change of the market regime 
 
Summary 
Apart from the UK where it has been widely discussed in the 2011 Electricity Market Reform, energy 
experts communities are still unaware of the impacts that carbon policies directly focused on the 
development of low carbon technologies produce on the electricity market regime. Public co-ordination 
with long term arrangements needs to be introduced as a substitute to long term co-ordination by the 
market. Indeed, the current market co-ordination makes carbon prices ineffective at orienting investors 
towards low carbon technologies: fossil fuel generation technologies are preferred because their 
investment risks are much lower in the market regime. So, in order to avoid delayed investment aiming 
at the decarbonisation of electricity systems, a number of new market arrangements which lower the 
investment risk of these technologies are being selected by governments. But, as these low carbon 
equipments develop, long term co-ordination by the market for the other technologies (peaking units, 
CCGT) will fade away. That means that in the future, public co-ordination and planning will completely 
replace market players’ decisions, not only for low carbon technologies, but for every capacity 
development. 
 
Keywords: technology-focused carbon policies, electricity markets, generation investment, risk 
management criterion, market failures, coordination role of market, planning. 
 
 
Institutions et transition vers des systèmes électriques décarbonés 
L’invisible changement du régime de marché 
 
Résumé 
La communauté des économistes de l’énergie et du climat n’est pas encore complètement consciente 
des changements que les politiques climatiques focalisées sur les technologies bas carbone vont 
entraîner sur le régime de marché des industries électriques. De telles politiques doivent introduire 
une coordination publique forte, combinée avec des arrangements de long terme, coordination, qui se 
substitue à la coordination de long terme par le marché. Cette coordination par le marché est 
actuellement inefficace car elle ne permet pas au prix du carbone d’orienter les  investisseurs vers les 
technologies bas carbone à coût fixe élevé. On montre que les technologies émettrices sont préférées 
à ces dernières car la gestion du risque d’investissement est beaucoup plus aisée avec elles et que ce 
critère prend le pas sur celui du moindre coût marginal de long terme. Aussi, afin d’éviter de retarder 
la décarbonation des systèmes électriques, les pays doivent adopter rapidement de nouveaux 
arrangements de marché qui diminuent radicalement le risque d’investissement en  technologies bas 
carbone. Mais, au fur et à mesure que les équipements bas carbone tirés artificiellement dans le 
marché occupent la majorité du système, les autres technologies flexibles (CCGT) et de pointe à 
combustibles fossiles et dont on a besoin ne peuvent plus se développer par le marché. En 
conséquence, à long terme, coordination publique et planification vont complètement remplacer les 
décisions d’investissement des agents décentralisées pour tous les équipements et pas seulement les 
équipements bas carbone, reléguant le marché dans une simple fonction de coordination horaire dans 
l’exploitation des équipements électriques. 
 
Mots-clés: Politiques des technologies bas carbone, marchés électriques, investissement, critère de 
gestion de risque, défaillances de marché, coordination par le marché, planification. 
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Summary 
Apart from the UK where it has been widely discussed in the 2011 Electricity Market Reform, energy 
experts communities are still unaware of the impacts that carbon policies directly focused on the 
development of low carbon technologies produce on the electricity market regime. Public co-
ordination with long term arrangements needs to be introduced as a substitute to long term co-
ordination by the market. Indeed, the current market co-ordination makes carbon prices ineffective 
at orienting investors towards low carbon technologies: fossil fuel generation technologies are 
preferred because their investment risks are much lower in the market regime. So, in order to avoid 
delayed investment aiming at the decarbonisation of electricity systems, a number of new market 
arrangements which lower the investment risk of these technologies are being selected by 
governments. But, as these low carbon equipments develop, long term co-ordination by the market 
for the other technologies (peaking units, CCGT) will fade away. That means that in the future, public 
co-ordination and planning will completely replace market players’ decisions, not only for low carbon 
technologies, but for every capacity development.   
Keywords: Technology-focused carbon policies, electricity markets, generation investment, risk 
management criterion, market failures, coordination role of market, planning 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Ambitious decarbonisation objectives of electricity systems – like those promoted by the 
European Union’s Roadmap 2050 or those which would be necessary in the OECD for 
reaching the 450 ppm stabilization goal1 – conflict with the electricity market reforms still 
                                                             
1 In the 450 scenario of the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2011 (IEA, 2011), the proportion of low carbon 
equipment in the new capacity to install in OECD countries is quite high: 70 % from 2010 to 2020 and 95 % 
from 2020 to 2035. 
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championed by a number of OECD and European Union countries. The market regime raises 
a problem as it impedes the effectiveness of climate policies: besides energy efficiency 
measures, generators are asked to make low carbon investments which are by nature capital 
intensive, while they are in parallel made riskier by current electricity markets. The problem 
is that, since market liberalization, investment and market risks are borne by the investor. In 
the former regime of vertical integrated utility monopoly, however, the tariff regulation 
system which aligned prices on averaged costs transferred the investment risks to 
consumers .Now the price at which an investor in capital intensive technology can sell the 
electricity he produces bears little or no relation to his own costs, which entails an important 
risk level for recovering large fixed costs. Problems are not only uncertainty on electricity 
price but also (1) long term uncertainty on carbon price, (2) unclear competitiveness levels 
of decentralised renewables (RES-E) and low carbon technologies (LCT) with respect to fossil 
fuel generation, and (3) the importance of learning investments in large-sized LCT2 which 
combine two major risk characteristics: capital intensity (with large upfront costs and long 
lead times for construction) and high political and regulatory risks (Grubb et Newbery, 2007; 
Skea, 2010).  
Public co-ordination and new market arrangements are thus needed to de-risk RES-E and 
LCT investments by shifting risks towards government or more efficiently on consumers, and 
by output-based subsidization. Symptomatically  the pioneering country in electricity market 
liberalization, the United Kingdom, is implementing a quite radical reform to allow large 
investments in low carbon technologies and to monitor it by a planning process (DECC, 
2011). The challenge in designing these new market arrangements is to combine public and 
market co-ordinations in order to maintain some incentives, while simultaneously reducing 
the risks inherent to the market regime sufficiently so as to ease investments. Another issue 
that is likely to arise from the implementation of these two combined co-ordinations is that 
the rapid deployment of low carbon technologies they will enable, will induce an erosion of 
the long term market price signal for investing in the other generation technologies 
(combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) and peaking units), which are needed for long term 
security, flexible back-up of intermittent RES-E and semi base-load supply.  
                                                             
2
 Large sized LCTs include off-shore wind, new nuclear, carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) and 
concentration solar power (CSP). 
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We first present the different market failures that impede the investment in low carbon 
technologies. Then in the following sections, we analyze two types of policy responses. The 
first one consists in decentralised approaches either by guaranteeing prices over the long 
term or by imposing a clean energy obligation on retailers. The second consists in strong 
public co-ordination for planning and risk management through long term contracting. 
Finally we conclude to the progressive shift from the market paradigm to a hybrid regime in 
which public planning has the central role and market co-ordination is progressively 
demoted, receiving only the modest role of ensuring the  co-ordination of market players. 
 
2. Market failures and investment in low carbon investment 
The electricity market has two co-ordination functions. The first one, which concerns the 
short term, is to ensure the efficient operation of the set of competitors’ equipment. The 
second is to indicate scarcity through a price signal to orient investors’ decisions in the long 
term. In textbook electricity market theory, there is total consistency between short and 
long term market co-ordination in a perfect informational environment. The optimal 
technology mix that results from market players’ investment decisions is identical to utility 
planners’ optimum in the former regulated utility regime.  
Because of the non-storability of electricity, the wholesale market is a (semi-)hourly market, 
and the clearing price is set every hour by the marginal bid that satisfies the load demand. 
Generators offer energy for each hourly market at a price sufficient to recover their running 
costs (the sum of fuel and carbon costs), but with no profit margin so as to increase their 
chances of being dispatched. This marginal bid price is paid to all dispatched generators, 
whatever their individual offers under this price. So each dispatched generator with lower 
running costs than the hourly price receives extra-revenue above his short term costs, called 
the “infra-marginal rent”.  The theory says that, under this marginal pricing model, the sum 
of these hourly rents will cover the fixed costs of each new plant whatever the cost strture of 
its technology.3 Peaking units however constitute a special case. When the physical 
                                                             
3
 Given the non-storability of electricity, it is efficient to use a set of different technologies with a specialization 
of low capital intensive ones for the peak load, and the capital intensive ones for the base load.  
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equilibrium of the system is tight, all the generators could, by an implicit entente, bid at a 
price very much higher than the marginal cost of their last peaking units (for instance 1500 
€/MWh when the running costs of the last dispatched unit is 120€/MWh). They should, 
indeed, bid in this way because they need such a scarcity rent in order to preserve a chance 
of recovering the fixed costs of peaking units.4  Regarding low carbon capacity development, 
marginal pricing will account for the carbon price because fossil fuel units are always the 
marginal generator. With a carbon price, electricity producers that have low emissions will 
thus achieve higher infra-marginal rents than in the counterfactual scenario without carbon 
policy. This should signal to electricity producers to prefer investment in low carbon 
technologies rather than in CO2 emitting technologies to complement their portfolio of 
equipment. However, the risks attached to the fixed cost recovery of new generation 
equipment vary considerably depending on the capital intensity of the different 
technologies. Risk management can thus supersede the cost minimization criteria in 
investment choices, at the detriment of investment in large upfront cost technologies, and in 
particular low carbon ones. 
 Market failure for capital intensive investments 
The low carbon technologies being very capital intensive, market failures may preclude their 
development.  They present cost structures and risk profiles which differ totally from those 
of their fossil fuel alternatives. Whatever climate policies in electricity markets, gas 
technology (CCGT) is systematically preferred by investors over capital intensive 
technologies, despite higher levelised cost expectations. Indeed, low carbon technologies’ 
investment costs represent more than 65% of their levelised cost (respectively 75.6% for 
nuclear, 66.8% for coal with CCS, and 83.5% for wind power) with a 10% capital cost5,  in 
sharp contrast with around 17% for CCGT and 40% for coal generation (see Table 1). The 
situation is the same for decentralised RES-E.   
 
                                                             
4
 It is noteworthy that the scarcity rent during extreme peak benefit to every equipment and  is on the top of 
the infra-marginal rents for the other equipment. 
5
 In market regime the weighted average capital cost is close to 10%, while in the regulated utility regime it is 
close to 5%,  that increases the levelised cost of a nuclear or CCS equipment by 30% around. 
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Table 1: Comparison of generation cost structures (with a 10% capital cost) 
 Nuclear Coal Coal with CCS CCGT  Wind power Solar PV 
Investment* ($ per kW)  4100 2133 3840 1070 2350-onshore 
(4000-offshore) 
6000 
Size of the units 1.500MW 700 MW 700 MW 400 MW 20MW onshore 2 MW 
Levelised costs ($/MWh) 98.75 80.05 89.95 92.11** 137,1 (220.0) 618.55 
Investment cost  % 75.6 % 39.8% 66.8% 17.3% 83.5% 94.9% 
O&M  % 14.9% 7.5% 15.1% 4.9% 16.5% 4.0% 
Fuel costs  % 9.5 % 22.8% 14.5% 66.4% 0% 0% 
CO2 cost ***  % 0  % 29.9% 3.6% 11.4% 0% 0% 
*Overnight cost. ** Hypothesis on gas price : $7.8/MMbtu . *** Hypothesis on CO2 price: 30/tCO2              
Source: NEA/IEA, 2010. Projected cost of electricity generation. Tables 5.2, 6.1. &  6.2. 
 
This has an important consequence for investing in RES-E and LCTs in this market 
environment. Indeed, their cost recovery will depend upon the market price which in annual 
average, will never be aligned on their cost-price per MWh. They will operate as baseload, 
ahead of coal generation and CCGT, because they are cheaper to run in terms of variable 
costs. But the considerable gap between their variable cost and their average cost is full of 
risk for the recovery of their fixed costs. Even if they can run as much as possible, there is an 
intrinsic risk that periods of low prices happen, with as a consequence a net revenue which 
will be lower than the level they need for their fixed cost recovery and their debt payment. It 
contrasts with CCGTs which not only benefit from low need of capital per kW, but also from 
a cost structure which allows it to be self-hedged. Indeed in most of the electricity markets, 
it is a CCGT unit which is the marginal dispatched unit during most of the year. So CCGT 
running costs i.e. their fuel and carbon costs, are narrowly correlated with electricity prices. 
The conclusion is surprising: Because hourly electricity prices are highly correlated with fuel 
and carbon prices, investment risks in fossil fuel generation are much lower than those in 
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LCTs and RES-E. Consequently carbon price is ineffective to orient investors towards low-
carbon high fixed-cost technologies. 
 Other market failures for low carbon technologies 
This market failure amplifies the effects of other market failures and regulatory 
imperfections which also create barriers for every low carbon power technology. First, the 
uncertainty that concerns the carbon price’s future trajectory,  and which reflects huge 
uncertainty on long term climate policy, suppresses the incentive that carbon pricing 
intended to create to invest in these technologies (Blyth et al., 2007). Second, the benefits 
derived from cumulative learning of new low carbon technologies are not captured by the 
investors, while the social benefits would balance the cost of learning investment (Jaffe, 
Newell and Stavins, 2005). Third, the characteristics of large-sized technology and the 
complexity of their systems (off-shore windpower, new nuclear, CCS, CSP) magnify learning 
costs and risks, the chain of innovations being too long, too complex and diverse. Moreover 
these larger investment risks, inherent to learning investment, are magnified by important 
regulatory (licensing, planning, change of safety rules) and political risks exist, with 
implications for costs, financing conditions and earnings. (Grubb et al., 2006; Finon et 
Roques, 2008; Finon, 2011).  
 Increasing “missing money” to invest in peaking units 
Peaking units which are needed for long term reliability are very capital intensive because 
their fixed cost could only be recovered from scarcity rents resulting in short term price 
spikes during very short periods of extreme peaks. But the revenues generated by most price 
spikes are random and not sufficient to cover these fixed costs for two main reasons:  first 
the out-of-market interventions of the system operator in these situations(for instance by 
preventively calling reserves), which depresses the market price, and second the price cap 
decided by regulators in order to maintain reforms acceptation. The two factors limit 
scarcity rents during peak and extreme peak periods which deter investment in peaking units 
and have a negative impact on generation adequacy. This is the so-called “missing money” 
problem (Cramton and Stoft, 2007; Joskow 2008). This issue will be amplified by the 
development of low carbon equipment because, as they have low variable costs, their hourly 
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productions displace the merit order curve at the detriment of peaking units and gas CCGTs. 
This reduces scarcity rents on the hourly markets during peak periods which are crucial for 
the former ones, as well as the number of running hours with infra-marginal rents for the 
latter ones.  In order to solve this “missing money” problem, some regulators adapt the 
market design by adding a capacity mechanism which distributes a complement of stable 
revenue to each equipment as a function of their reliability during peaks. RES-E and LCT 
deployments will increase the need for such a mechanism. To conclude, new market 
arrangements are needed to de-risk RES-E and LCT investments by shifting the risk towards 
consumers and government6 and, for some of them, by long term subsidization of their 
learning costs. This implies the definition of explicit and consistent roles for the government 
and credible commitments to interest investors (Helm, 2010 ; Helm and Hepburn, 2008). To 
ensure this credibility, arrangements which rely on the consumers to subsidize costs and 
assume major part of the risks should be preferred to those which are based on public 
budget support (investment subsidy, tax credit on production, loan guarantees) and are thus 
exposed to policy U-turn risks.  
 
3. Technology-specific policies to replace long-term market co-ordination 
The development of RES-E and low carbon equipment should be efficiently promoted by 
technology-focused policies combining long term market arrangements and specific public 
governance to manage them. In order to achieve this, alternative policy routes can be 
followed. The first one aims to stimulate decentralised decisions. This can be done along the 
two conventional principles of public policies: price incentives with guaranteed revenues by 
an output-based subsidy for investors, or alternatively, quantitative incentives associated to 
an obligation borne by competing suppliers/retailers to increase the share of clean electricity 
in their wholesale sourcing by contracting with new low carbon entrants. However, in order 
to effectively reach objectives while controlling rent, a third policy route which is based on 
strong public governance is increasingly contemplated. It consists in monitoring RES-E and 
                                                             
6
 A loan guarantee on 80 % of investment cost of a nuclear plant or a CCS plant helps to reduce the levelised 
cost by around 30% by decreasing the weighted average capital cost by 3% (MIT, 2009).   
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LCTs deployment by regular auctioning for long term fixed-price contracts with LCT 
investors.  
 Pulling low carbon technologies development by feed-in tariffs (FIT) 
In Germany the ambitious decarbonisation policy is solely based on these FIT arrangements. 
The aim is to increase decentralised and centralized RES-E’s share in electricity generation 
from 20% in 2012, 40% in 2020 and 66% in 20308. This system is presently used in the 
majority of the European countries for the RES-E promotion because of its effectiveness. The 
FIT mechanism is a long term public commitment which combines an obligation for the 
historical supplier in a given region to purchase RES electricity and the definition of a fixed 
price per generating technology on a 15 to 20 years term. Regulated FITs are technology 
specific and aligned on anticipated levelised costs9; after “trial and error” learning, they 
evolve in relation to supposed learning factors. The mandated buyers cover their costs by 
the revenue of a levy on every MWh transported by the grid. In these FIT systems, public 
governance consists in monitoring the quantitative development of RES-E and LCT by 
defining the FITs by aligning them on anticipated cost-price for each technology and by 
regularly tuning their level along the revision rules promulgated by law. Indeed the regulator 
might decide to decrease the FIT for one technology on any new installations in order to 
slow its development down when the FIT is too high and developers’ rent inadequately 
important.  
 Clean energy obligation on suppliers’  sourcing 
This system has been implemented for the development of RES-E in some European 
countries (Great Britain, Italy, Sweden, Belgium), Australian states and US jurisdictions 
where it is called Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS). It is currently in the process of being 
                                                             
8
 In this issue Stephan Lechtenböhmer analyzes in detail the German institutional model for the 
decarbonisation of the electricity system. It combines FITs, reformed balancing mechanisms related to 
intermittent production development, demand response and electricity saving measures. Offshore wind power 
will develop with generous FIT arrangements, while in other countries (Germany, France, the Netherlands etc.), 
long term contracting after tendering will be preferred. 
9
These regulated-based arrangements are generally applied to decentralised RES-E, but they could be extended 
to large-sized low carbon technologies like off-shore wind in Germany. In the policy called “Energy Concept” 
voted in 2010 in which the offshore wind target by 2030 is 25 GW, this technology will be financially supported 
by a high FIT tariff and a €5 billion special credit plan from the redevelopment agency financed by the revenue 
of carbon permit auctioning. 
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extended into a “clean energy obligation” by including some other low carbon 
technologies.10  Market shares of RES-E and LCT generation might be rapidly increased 
through this mechanism up to 50-60% in 2030, provided that this increase is correctly 
calibrated in relation to learning constraints and industrial capacities.11 The obligation is set 
in relation to the supplier’s market share, which avoids distortion in the retail competition. 
By changing the supplier’s license, the regulator establishes a mandate to contract for a 
specific share of low carbon electricity, with a progressive increase of the obligation. A 
complementary market for clean energy certificates enables certificate exchanges between 
developers and suppliers, and between suppliers which are short with those which are long. 
Enforcement of the obligation is complemented by a penalty which acts as a price cap. In 
some countries where the government wants to limit obligation costs for the suppliers and 
the consumers, the penalty is only defined at a modest level and has a function of buy-out 
price. Suppliers are supposed to hedge their certificates’ acquisition on a long term basis 
either by signing long term contracts at fixed price with new developers (as it is the case in 
Texas) or by self dealing with their RES subsidiary or their own low carbon equipment, in 
particular when they are vertically integrated . Two last options exist:  to buy on the spot 
market, and to pay the buy-out price, but they are viewed as adjustments options (Finon and 
Perez, 2007; Mitchell et al, 2007). 
 Central auctioning of long term energy contracts with LCT entrants 
When in a country, large-sized LCTs deployment is viewed as a major means to decarbonise 
the electric system, centralized approaches that encompass auctioning and long term 
contracting should be preferred for reasons of effectiveness. However, decentralised RES-E 
units could still benefit from FITs because FIT arrangements present much lower transaction 
costs than tendered contracts. The British government followed this route in its 2011 
Electricity Market Reform that can be referred to as a benchmark (DECC, 2010 and 2011).12  
Its target is to reach a 30% share of electricity production by RES-E in 2020, and a 75% share 
                                                             
10
 In the RPS of some jurisdictions in the USA, advanced nuclear and CCS are considered as eligible resources in 
the standard. 
11 It is noteworthy that in Californian RPS, the RES target which increases from 20% in 2010 to 33% in 2020 
(CPUC, 2010) should be consistently prolonged to 50-55% in 2030. 
12
 The Electricity Market Reform includes also complementary measures which overlap the incentives provided 
bylong term fixed price contracts: a carbon price floor (going up from 20£/tCO2 in 2015 to 70£/tCO2), and a 
decreasing carbon standard on new coal plants to incite to rapidly adopt CCS. This is explained by the 
governmental firmness in the decarbonisation policy. 
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by all the low carbon generators in 2030. In this type of centralized policies, scheduled 
tenders for long term energy contracts on key LCT options (off-shore wind, new nuclear, 
CCS, large biomass plants, etc.) will be organized in a timely way in order to provide time for 
building large units. These contracts could be designed so as to keep incentives to operate 
efficiently (see below). Public co-ordination has two aspects. First ministry defines the 
capacity to be tendered and the timing of the scheduled tenders. Second an independent 
delivery agency should be installed to auction, design and settle the contracts for each new 
vintage of plants. This agency plays the “central buyer” role. In the UK, the government 
chooses the transmission system operator for these functions.In conclusion governments 
could choose between different combinations of public governance and long term 
arrangements to organise the deployment of low carbon generators in electricity markets up 
to a 60-70% share by 2030. The choice of the institutional arrangement that is retained in 
the end depends on political beliefs (the environmental priority, the market culture), existing 
low carbon equipment (hydro and nuclear plants) and is subject to path dependencies with 
respect to RES-E policy. However, whatever the choice, an increasing share of generators’ 
entries will result from public co-ordination and no more from long term market co-
ordination. 
 
4. The reduction of the role of electricity market co-ordination  
Short term market co-ordination can be preserved and incentives maintained for LCT and 
fossil fuel equipment operational efficiency by obliging the low carbon generators to sell 
their production on the electricity markets, while they benefit from the hedge offered by the 
long term arrangements or they get a supplement of revenues on the top of electricity price 
from the latter.  But, as said, an increasing share of generation investment will escape to 
long term energy market co-ordination, but not only low carbon investment targeted by the 
policies. Investments in the fossil fuel plants which will still be needed for peaking 
production and semi-base load will also be affected by market failures. The consequence is 
that investment in these other fossil equipment should need to be supported. At the end, 
the objectives of decarbonisation and long term supply reliability should progressively 
converge and should be pursued by the use of the same market mechanism. 
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  Gradual erosion of the market’s predominance for long term co-ordination  
Investment in each generation technology will become increasingly exposed to fixed cost 
recovery difficulties and to risks entailed by RES-E and LCT’s large-scale deployment which is 
favored by new risk-sharing arrangements. Fossil fuel plants will be displaced in the hourly 
market dispatch merit order because these productions have low variable costs (figure 1). 
Average annual price will decrease.  New equipment’s fixed cost recovery will be affected by 
the lower and random infra-marginal rents anticipated at the moment of decision13. This has 
three institutional effects in the long term.  
Figure 1: Reduction of hourly infra-marginal rents after windpower deployment 
 
 
First, while in terms of levelised costs, the semi-base load technologies (CCGT) remain 
competitive for this semi-base load production and are needed for the back-up of variable 
RES generation, given their flexibility, the deployment of especially intermittent RES-E 
undermines the case for investing in them. Besides the decrease of average annual price, 
there are indeed two other reasons: the decrease of running hours that they will 
experiment, and moreover the uncertainty on them. As long as the share of low carbon 
                                                             
13 This situation is already observed on the Spanish and German markets. Indeed, because of their important 
windpower capacities, episodes of prices equal to zero or even negative have alerted the electricity community 
to new risks of investing in any technology, and in particular in the CCGT (Eurelectric, 2011). 
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generation increases, investors in the semi-base load plants will experience increasing 
revenues’ uncertainty, making fixed cost recovery more risky, even if they still benefit from 
self-hedging property (see above).   
Second, the large-scale deployment of intermittent production will increase the need for 
reserve margins. In parallel it will erode, even suppress scarcity rents during extreme peak 
and heighten price volatility during peak period, which both increase the “missing money” 
problem for investing in peaking units, because of the larger risk premium in their capital 
return. So in countries where a capacity mechanism has not yet been implemented as in the 
European countries, these two evolutions (semi base-load plants and need of larger reserve 
margin) will create the necessity of a market-wide mechanism in order to provide an 
additional and stable revenue stream to incentivize investment in reliable capacities, and not 
only in peaking units, but in every technology.14  
Third, introducing policies for promoting RES-E and LCTs through these new risk-sharing 
arrangements might probably lead to a policy lock-in. Indeed, if these policies were removed 
even LCT technologies which will be commercially mature (i.e. hence having competitive 
levelised costs after learning) would be a risky investment and would become financially 
unviable. The reason is simple: the major share of LCT and RES-E equipment with low 
running costs in the electricity systems, which induces a low marginal price during longer 
and longer periods. This is a structural fact which has to be underlined. 
 The convergence of carbon policy and capacity adequacy policy 
A more comprehensive approach based on a strong public governance has been proposed to 
deal with both objectives of decarbonisation and capacity adequacy through the same policy 
instrument which would be a market-wide capacity forward auctioning (Helm, 2010; 
Gottstein and Schwarz, 2010; Boot and van Bree, 2010). The capacity auction starts by fixing 
the quantity of new capacity required and invites bids from investors to provide blocks of 
incremental capacity. The bid is for a long term contract to supply reliable capacity (to be 
available during peak), and the counterparty is the TSO. Each provider of capacity in any 
                                                             
14
 In Europe it is the increased share of windpower production which presently is incentivizing the 
implementation of capacity mechanisms.  
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technology will receive an “availability” payment for capacity through their revenues from 
forward capacity contracts, while they receive payment for the electricity they produce 
through the electricity market for their running costs. So the market keeps its role of short 
term operational co-ordination. 
The difference with the former RES and low carbon arrangements presented above is that it 
deals with capacity and not with energy. And the difference with the current capacity market 
mechanisms (which only addresses long term supply security) will be the long time span of 
forward capacity contracts to guarantee revenue stream on a long period for all new 
capacities; this is a necessity for low carbon equipment which are capital intensive. A 
number of studies have been conducted on various aspects of this concept. The British 
regulator evaluated the possibility to differentiate contracts as a function of the 
characteristics of the technologies in its Discovery Project on the new market arrangements 
before the reform (OFGEM, 2010). Helm investigated the best-suited design of the auction 
to reveal information on the different technologies regarding costs and lead-time of projects 
(Helm, 2010). Finally Gottstein and Schwarz (2010) looked into the possibility to discriminate 
between carbon intensive and low carbon technologies.  Nevertheless recent experiences of 
capacity market mechanisms in the USA (in the PJM market and the New England one) show 
that climate-friendly options such as decentralised generation (in particular cogeneration), 
demand response programs and energy efficiency contracts, can be introduced in the set of 
eligible resources to bid in capacity market tendering.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Whatever the new arrangements adopted by governments, public co-ordination should 
increasingly replace the market for pursuing long term decarbonisation objectives. In all 
these technology-focused policies, the much broader role of the regulator includes: 
determining quantity of various generation equipment, guaranteeing the contracts with LCT 
and RES-E entrants, and even defining the prices for these productions in some regulatory 
options. Low carbon investments can thus be “de-risked” and learning costs subsidized, by 
shifting risks and overcosts towards consumers via a levy. This marks a significant shift from 
 
 
18 
 
the market paradigm, where investments are decided by decentralised agents on the basis 
of market price expectations, and investment risks borne by them.  
Moreover these new arrangements not only put the major share of new electricity 
generation outside the long term price signal given by the market, but this expansion also 
changes the market’s functions for the investment decisions in fossil fuel generation units. 
Because of the progressive extension of the “missing money” problem to all of them, 
centralized co-ordination would have to cover the whole range of technologies and new 
capacities, in particular under the form of a forward capacity auctioning. These changes in 
the market regime should be rapidly recognized as such by governments, regulators and 
experts in countries who have liberalized their electricity sector, and by international 
organizations such as the IEA and the European Commission, which have been fervent 
promoters of the electricity market regime15. The case is particularly crucial in the European 
Union where, despite the priority of carbon policy objectives, this inevitable change in 
market regime is not fully recognized, without any perspective of radical modifications in the 
electricity market Directives and Competition Policy principles, while these changes would 
ease the needed decarbonisation investments in electricity markets. But it is another story. 
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